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OPENING INDIA’S LEGAL MARKET: THE 
MADRAS HIGH COURT CRACKS THE 
DOOR FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS 
KATIE FEUER* 
Abstract: Until 2012 India, barred foreign lawyers from formally practicing 
law in the country. On February 21, 2012, however, the Madras High Court, 
in A.K. Balaji v. Gov’t of India, handed a victory to international law firms 
keen on entering the Indian market alongside their globalizing clients. The 
Balaji decision marked the Indian judiciary’s first concerted effort to carve 
back the blanket prohibition, by permitting foreign lawyers to enter India on a 
temporary basis to conduct arbitrations, or advise clients on matters of foreign 
and international law. Although many practitioners and scholars alike applaud 
the Madras Court’s decision, the case also exposes the numerous regulations 
governing India’s legal profession, thus raising concerns about domestic law-
yers’ ability to compete in a now increasingly global market. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 21, 2012, the Madras High Court (Madras Court), in A.K. 
Balaji v. Gov’t of India, handed a victory to international law firms keen on 
entering the Indian market alongside their globalizing clients.1 India pro-
                                                                                                                           
 * Katie Feuer is a Note Editor for Volume 38 of the Boston College International & Compar-
ative Law Review. 
 1 See Balaji v. Gov’t of India, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010 (Madras H.C. Feb. 21, 2012) (India), avail-
able at http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/qrydisp.aspx?filename=35290. The decision was appealed to 
the Supreme Court of India, where it is currently pending, and which affirmed the Madras High 
Court’s ruling until a final decision is reached. See Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, Bar 
Council of India v. Balaji, (2013) No. 17150-17154/2012 (India July 7, 2013), available at http://
courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/sc%2017150-1715412p.txt. See generally David B. Wilkins & 
Mihaela Papa, The Rise of the Corporate Legal Elite in the BRICS: Implications for Global Gov-
ernance, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1149 (2013) (examining the growth, and regulation of, 
legal services markets India, as well as other rapidly growing economies). The Indian judiciary 
consists of multiple levels of courts. See Indian Courts, INDIAN COURTS, http://indiancourts.
nic.in/index.html (follow “Indian Judiciary” hyperlink) (last visited October 29, 2014). The Su-
preme Court of India is the country’s highest tribunal and its decisions are binding on all lower 
courts. See id. Below the Supreme Court are eighteen High Courts. See id. Each High Court is the 
supreme court of the state in which it sits. See id. The Madras High Court is the highest court in 
the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. See Madras High Court, HCMADRAS, 
http://www.hcmadras.tn.nic.in (last visited May 2, 2014). A High Court’s decision is binding 
within its state and of persuasive value to other High Courts. See INDIAN COURTS, supra. Below 
High Courts are district courts, which state governments establish. See id. High Courts primarily 
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tects its legal market to a far greater extent than other countries, and has 
largely shut out foreign lawyers.2 Until this ruling, India—at least formal-
ly—barred foreign lawyers from practicing law in the country at all.3 One 
decision in 2009, from one of India’s highest courts, affirmed the prohibi-
tion and held that international firms could not set up offices in India even if 
only for business development purposes.4 
The A.K. Balaji judgment, however, marks an effort to carve back the 
blanket prohibition, by permitting foreign lawyers to enter India on a tem-
porary basis to conduct arbitrations, or advise clients on matters of foreign 
and international law.5 Part I of this Comment provides background into the 
regulations that serve to keep foreign lawyers out, as well as the efforts for-
eign lawyers have made to circumvent those restrictions. Part I also pro-
vides an overview of the current state of the Indian bar. Part II discusses the 
Madras Court’s decision. Part III argues that the reasoning employed by the 
Madras Court highlights the weaknesses of the restrictive regulations gov-
erning India’s legal profession. In particular, Part III argues that Madras 
Court’s decision exposes inherent difficulties in enforcing the prohibition on 
foreign lawyers and that the restrictions themselves are incompatible with 
the Indian government’s expressed economic goals. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Legal and Regulatory Hurdles 
Before 1990, India had a closed economy.6 In the early 1990s, the gov-
ernment introduced a series of economic reforms which permitted foreign 
direct investment and multinational corporations to enter the country.7 In-
                                                                                                                           
have appellate jurisdiction, although they have original jurisdiction in cases, such as in Balaji, 
involving writ petitions. See id. 
 2 See, e.g., Wilkins & Papa, supra note 1, at 1172; Joanne Harris, Pitch Battle, THE LAWYER, 
May 14, 2012, http://www.thelawyer.com/pitch-battle/1012545.article (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 3 See Wilkins & Papa, supra note 1, at 1172; Harris, supra note 2. 
 4 See Kian Ganz, Chennai Writ Losers: LPOs, CAs, Secondments & Logic. Winners: Invisible 
In-House & Pragmatism, LEGALLY INDIA (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.legallyindia.com/2012
02242598/Analysis/editorial-chennai-foreign-firm-ruling-ignores-in-house-endangers-indian-lpos-
cas-secondments-a-common-sense-for-pragmatism (last visited Oct. 16, 2014); Lawyers Collec-
tive v. Bar Council of India, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995 (Bombay H.C. Dec. 16, 2009) (India), avail-
able at http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/data/judgements/2009/OSWP8152695.pdf. 
 5 See Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶ 63; Harris, supra note 2. 
 6 See, e.g., Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57, 65 
(2010); Chris Vena, Comment, More Than Best Friends: Expansion of Global Law Firms into the 
Indian Legal Market, 31 NW. J. INT’ L & BUS. 195, 195–96 (2011). 
 7 See, e.g., Krishnan, supra note 6, at 65 (“[T]he immediate, recognizable consequence was 
that foreign investment and multinational corporations soon entered the country.”). 
18 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
dia’s economy has developed rapidly since those reforms.8 Consequently, 
foreign law firms, particularly those from the United States, England, and 
Australia, began looking for ways to enter the market in order to better ad-
vise their globalizing clients, and to compete for a growing market of new 
Indian clients.9 
Despite the country’s liberalization in other industries, the Indian legal 
market has remained firmly closed to outsiders. 10 Paramount among the 
barriers to entry is the Advocates Act of 1961 (Advocates Act or the Act), a 
statute that governs the practice of law in India.11 The key provision of the 
Act is section 29, which states that only “advocates” are entitled to practice 
law in India.12 To be an advocate, one must also be an Indian citizen.13 This 
is subject to two narrow exceptions: (1) If another country permits Indian 
lawyers to practice in its jurisdiction, then lawyers from that country will be 
granted reciprocal privileges in India; or (2) otherwise by special permis-
sion of the Bar Council of India (BCI).14 
As a practical matter, foreign lawyers have been unable to take ad-
vantage of either exception.15 India, thus far, has maintained that reciprocity 
means admittance without bar passage or other licensing requirements, for 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Macroeconomics & Economic Growth in Southeast Asia: Growth in India, THE WORLD 
BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/PHG41GT9I0 (last visited May 2, 2014) (“Since 1991 [India] has 
been among the top 10 percent of the world’s countries in terms of economic growth.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Vena, supra note 6, at 195–96; see also Christine Garg, Note, Affiliations: Foreign 
Law Firms’ Path into India, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1165, 1170–71 (noting Australia and U.K. 
lobbying the Indian government to open its legal market). See generally James Podgers & Rhonda 
McMillion, Two-Way Street: ABA Urges Obama Administration to Ask India to Ease Restrictions 
on Foreign Lawyers, 97 A.B.A. J. 60 (2011) (arguing that U.S. lawyers should be granted greater 
access to the legal markets of key trading partners in order to better facilitate cross-border transac-
tions). 
 10 See Wilkins & Papa, supra note 1, at 1172; Harris, supra note 2. 
 11 See Krishnan, supra note 6, at 67–68; Garg, supra note 9, at 1175. Before the enactment of 
the Advocates Act, India’s legal system resembled that of the United Kingdom, which distin-
guished between legal practitioners who practice in court and legal practitioners who did not. See 
Garg, supra note 9, at 175. One of the goals of the Advocates Act was to establish greater uni-
formity in the legal profession. See id. The Act created a single class of lawyers, called advocates, 
and instituted uniform qualifications for admittance. See id. The Act also established the Bar 
Council of India (BCI) as the legal profession’s exclusive, and supreme, regulatory body. See id. 
The Act authorized the BCI to administer, enforce and implement new regulations, which includes 
determining the qualifications for bar enrollment, licensing practitioners and accrediting law 
schools. See Krishnan, supra note 6, at 67–68. See generally Advocates Act, No. 25 of 1961, IN-
DIA CODE (1961). 
 12 See Advocates Act § 29; Krishnan, supra note 6, at 67. 
 13 See Advocates Act § 24(1)(a); Krishnan, supra note 6, at 67–68. 
 14 See Advocates Act § 47. 
 15 See Garg, supra note 9, at 1176. 
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which other countries do not provide.16 In addition, the Indian judiciary has 
not granted foreign firms special permission to practice in India.17 
Consequently, foreign firms sought entry into the Indian market through 
alternate means.18 Soon after India opened its borders to foreign corporations 
in the early 1990s, three law firms, Chadbourne & Parke, White & Case, and 
Ashurst Morris Crisp, obtained authorization from the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI), which has statutory authority to license commercial enterprises, to 
open offices in India for business development purposes.19 
Shortly thereafter, in 1995, Lawyers Collective, an Indian public inter-
est organization, filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court seeking to 
enjoin the foreign firms from operating in India.20 The petitioners charged 
the law firms with using their liaison offices as fronts for full-fledged legal 
practices in violation of the Advocates Act.21 In response, the defendant 
firms argued that “practicing law,” as defined by the Act, only applied to 
litigious activities, and because they were not engaged in litigation, the Act 
did not apply to them.22 
The Bombay High Court rejected that argument.23 The court concluded 
that the Advocates Act applied to litigators as well as non-litigators, and that 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Wilkins & Papa, supra note 1, at 1174; Garg, supra note 9, at 1177. The Act does not 
define reciprocity, and thus the provisions have generated a great deal of confusion. See Wilkins 
& Papa, supra note 1, at 1174. Opponents of liberalization claim foreign jurisdictions do not grant 
complete reciprocity. See id. The United States, for example, imposes hurdles, such as LL.M re-
quirements, which India does not. See id. Proponents, on the other hand, argue that such licensing 
requirements do not constitute a complete prohibition because Indian lawyers may practice once 
the requirements are satisfied. See id. India, in response, has linked reciprocity not only to licens-
ing requirements but to immigration issues as well. See id. The General Secretary for the Bar As-
sociation of India argued that reciprocity did not exist with the United States because the United 
States made it much more difficult for Indian lawyers to obtain work permits than India did. See 
id. The debate over reciprocal conditions may soon be changing, however, as India, in 2010, im-
plemented the All India Bar Exam (2010). See Ganz, supra note 4. Prior to that, India did not 
require that its advocates pass an admission test. See id. 
 17 See Garg, supra note 9, at 1176. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See Vena, supra note 6, at 196–98. In keeping with the Advocates Act, the foreign firms 
could not practice law, but they could engage in “liaison” activities, which included setting up 
offices for the purposes of learning about the Indian business environment, collecting investment 
information, and serving as official representatives of the foreign firms to the Indian government. 
See id. 
 20 See Lawyers Collective, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995, ¶ 4; Vena, supra note 6, at 196–97. 
 21 See Lawyers Collective, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995, ¶ 9; Vena, supra note 6, at 197. 
 22 See Jaipat S. Jain, India Shuts Out Foreign Law Firms; Outside Counsel, LAW.COM (Apr. 1, 
2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202447244677 (last visited Oct. 16 2014). White & 
Case, in its reply affidavit, stated that its non-litigious activity included “drafting documents, review-
ing and providing comments on documents, conducting negotiations and advising clients on interna-
tional standards and customary practice relating to clients’ transactions.” See id. The source for this 
argument can be found in India’s constitution. See id. 
 23 See Lawyers Collective, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995, ¶¶ 55–60; Vena, supra note 6, at 198. 
20 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
admission as an advocate was a prerequisite to the practice of law in India.24 
Accordingly, the defendant firms were practicing law in violation of the 
Advocates Act.25 
B. The State of India’s Legal Profession 
According to the Indian Ministry of Finance 2012–2013 Economic 
Survey, there are approximately 1.2 million registered advocates in India.26 
The overwhelming majority are courtroom litigators operating as solo prac-
titioners.27 Commentators estimate that less than 10 percent of advocates 
are engaged in transactional practice.28 Transactional work is typically per-
formed by law firms, of which there are relatively few, given the size of 
India’s bar.29 This is primarily the result of regulations on the legal indus-
try.30 According to such regulations, firms may have no more than twenty 
partners, and until recently, could not take advantage of limited liability 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Lawyers Collective, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995, ¶ 54. The court reasoned as follows: 
It is not the case of the respondents [defendant firms] that in India individuals/law 
firms/companies are practising the profession of law in non-litigious matters without 
being enrolled as advocates under the 1961 Act. It is not even the case of the re-
spondents that in the countries in which their head office as well as their branch of-
fices are situated, persons are allowed to practice the profession of law in non-
litigious matters without being subjected to the control of any authority. In these cir-
cumstances, when the Parliament has enacted the 1961 Act to regulate persons prac-
ticing the profession of law, it would not be correct to hold that the 1961 Act is re-
stricted to persons practising in litigious matters and that the said Act does not apply 
to persons practising in non litigious matters. There is no reason to hold that in India 
the practise in non-litigious matters is unregulated. 
Id. 
 25 See Lawyers Collective, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995, ¶ 60. 
 26 See ECON. DIV. OF THE DEP’T OF ECON. AFFAIRS IN THE MINISTRY OF FIN., ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 2012–2013: SERVICES SECTOR 210, 226, available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/budget
2013-2014/es2012-13/echap-10.pdf [hereinafter ECONOMIC SURVEY]. This number is subject to 
some dispute. See Kian Ganz & Prachi Shrivastava, FM: Explore Foreign Law Firm India Access; 
Liaison Offices OK; India Law & LPO Inc Grow 8.2%, LEGALLY INDIA (Feb. 28, 2013), http://
www.legallyindia.com/News/econsurvey-2012-13-legal-services-grow-at-8-2-per-cent (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2014). BCI chairman Manan Kumar Mishra claimed in interviews that there were 1.7 
million registered advocates in India. See id. 
 27 See Krishnan, supra note 6, at 61 (“Marc Galanter’s observation from years back still gen-
erally remains true: ‘Among the prominent features of Indian lawyers are their orientation to 
courts to the exclusion of other legal settings . . . .’”). 
 28 See Vena, supra note 6, at 205. 
 29 See Krishnan, supra note 7, at 62; ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 26, at 226. The number 
of transactional lawyers is growing, however, as industrialization and the inflow of foreign direct 
investment has increased the amount of available corporate work. See ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra 
note 26, at 226. 
 30 See Vena, supra note 6, at 206. 
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protections.31 Consequently, partners faced the potential of unlimited per-
sonal liability—liability that increased with the size of the partnership—for 
their partners’ actions.32 Further regulations on law firms include a prohibi-
tion on marketing services, restrictions on the ability to borrow money, and 
a ban on contingent fee structures.33 
Despite these restrictions, the number of transactional lawyers, and 
thus the size of law firms, has grown throughout India’s economic liberali-
zation.34 India has roughly fifty elite law firms, which collectively perform 
the bulk of the lucrative corporate work.35 In 2000, these elite firms founded 
the political interest group, Society of Indian Law Firms (SILF).36 Tradi-
tionally, this group has been one of the staunchest opponents of liberaliza-
tion, in part, because they would be directly competing with foreign firms.37 
C. Foreign Firms in India Today 
It took fifteen years for the Bombay High Court to decide Lawyers 
Collective.38 In the interim, foreign firms found new ways to circumvent the 
Advocates Act and tap into the Indian market.39 Some law firms established 
India-focused practices in branch offices in Singapore or London.40 Other 
firms established formal affiliations with Indian law firms known as “best 
friend agreements.”41 Under these preferential arrangements, foreign and 
Indian firms engaged in reciprocal referral agreements, incentivizing for-
eign firms to invest time and resources into developing their Indian part-
ners.42 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See id. Technically some Indian law firms have managed to circumvent the twenty-partner 
limit by joining partnerships. See id. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. These restrictions are imposed by the BCI and adopted pursuant to its authority 
under the Advocates Act. See id. at 206, n.69. 
 34 See id.; ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 26, at 226. 
 35 See Krishnan, supra note 6, at 66, n.39 (estimating the number of lawyers these elite firms 
employ varies from 2,500 to 15,000). 
 36 See id. at 63. 
 37 See id. at 64–65. As the article points out SILF’s arguments against liberalization are more 
complex than simple fear of competition. See id. In fact SILF, unlike the BCI, approved of the 
Madras High Court’s decision in A.K. Balaji. See Kian Ganz, SILF View Clashes with BCI SC Ap-
peal over Foreign Lawyers but Says CA Firms Practise Illegally, LEGALLY INDIA (July 9, 2012), 
http://www.legallyindia.com/201207092942/Law-firms/silf-view-clashes-with-bci-sc-appeal-over-
foreign-lawyers-but-says-ca-firms-practise-illegally (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 38 See Lawyers Collective, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995, ¶ 4 (final judgment announced December 
16). 
 39 See Garg, supra note 9, at 1179. 
 40 See id. at 1176 (including examples of how several firms operate their Indian practices). 
 41 See id. at 1180–81. 
 42 See Ganz, supra note 4 (pointing out that while firms in best friend arrangements claim 
they do not engage in cross-border profit sharing, it is believed that some use complex financial 
22 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
The Lawyers Collective decision did not close the loopholes that 
emerged as it was being decided.43 Although the decision precludes foreign 
lawyers from practicing Indian law, the Bombay High Court did not answer 
the question of whether foreign lawyers could practice their own foreign 
law in India.44 In sum, aside from setting up permanent offices in India, it 
was unclear how much further the ban on foreign lawyers extended.45 
II. DISCUSSION 
On March 18, 2010, A.K. Balaji, an Indian lawyer acting on behalf of 
the Tamil Nadu-based Association of Indian Lawyers, filed a writ in the 
Madras High Court demanding a complete ban on foreign lawyers operating 
in India.46 The petition named thirty-one foreign law firms as defendants, 
including major U.K.-based firms Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Allen & 
Overy, and Clifford Chance, as well as U.S. firms like Wilmer Hale, Perkins 
Coie, Davis Polk & Wardell and White & Case, and Australia’s Clayton Ut 
and Freehills.47 
In his petition, Balaji contended that the defendants violated the Advo-
cates Act by practicing law in India without being enrolled as advocates.48 
Specifically, Balaji objected to foreign lawyers establishing Indian practices 
in neighboring countries, and entering India on a temporary basis to provide 
corporate legal services and conduct arbitrations.49 
                                                                                                                           
structures to skirt the issue); see also Garg, supra note 9, at 1188–90 (defending best friend ar-
rangements). 
 43 See Jain, supra note 22. 
 44 See Ganz, supra note 4. 
 45 See Jain, supra note 22 (“The Lawyers Collective may have temporarily succeeded in halt-
ing the formal entry of certain law firms but the victory was hollow: many foreign law firms have 
entered into ‘best-friend’ agreements with domestic firms or found other surreptitious ways in 
which to operate out of India.”); Ganz, supra note 4. 
 46 See Ganz, supra note 4; Affidavit of Petitioner, Balaji v. Gov’t of India at ¶ 18, W.P. No. 
5614 of 2010 (Madras H.C. Mar. 18, 2010) (India), available at http://www.barandbench.com/
userfiles/files/File/madras_hc_writ_petition.pdf [hereinafter Affidavit of Petitioner]. 
 47 See Affidavit of Petitioner, supra note 46, ¶ 18. The petition also named Integreon, an LPO 
firm, which Balaji alleged was acting like a law firm. See id. ¶ 12. 
 48 See id. ¶¶ 3–7, 10–11, 15–16, 18, 21. 
 49 See id. ¶ 11. As the petition stated, “[a]dvocates from various foreign law firms are often 
visiting India and conducting seminars in various parts of our country . . . Moreover they are also 
conducting arbitration in Indian Hotels . . . .” Id. Balaji also suggested that foreign lawyers, by 
flying in and out of India, were in violation of Indian income tax and immigration laws, “[t]hey 
are entering in to India through visitor’s visa but the actual intention of their visit is to indirectly 
market and earn money out of clients from India by way of seminars.” Id. 
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Balaji grounded his claim in the plain language of the Advocates Act, 
and its underlying policy concerns.50 As a preliminary matter, Balaji assert-
ed that the Act makes it “abundantly clear” that any lawyer who has not 
been admitted as an advocate by the BCI cannot practice law in India “in 
any manner.”51 
Moreover, Balaji asserted that the defendants did not come within the 
Act’s reciprocity exception.52 In fact, Balaji dedicated a substantial portion 
of his petition to the issue of reciprocity.53 Balaji conceded that non-Indian 
lawyers can practice law in India if their country of origin permits Indian 
lawyers to practice as well.54 He claims, however, that true reciprocity did 
not exist because the conditions those countries imposed on Indian lawyers 
were “far more cumbersome as compared to the easy accessibility of the 
Indian legal market.” 55 Balaji defined reciprocity as “reciprocal arrange-
ments” whereby India and a foreign country impose equivalent conditions 
on entry into their respective legal markets.56 
In addition to a textual argument, Balaji also made the policy argument 
that permitting entry of foreign lawyers without a reciprocal arrangement 
disadvantages domestic practitioners.57 As his petition stated, “foreign law 
firms should not be allowed to exploit the Indian legal market without actu-
ally opening up their domestic markets to Indian Lawyers.”58 
Even if reciprocity existed, Balaji argued that foreign lawyers should 
not be permitted to practice law in India without enrolling as advocates 
first.59 The Advocates Act subjects Indian lawyers to numerous restrictions, 
including a prohibition on advertising, which puts Indian firms at a disad-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See id. ¶¶ 5, 11, 16 (“So far as the Advocates on the rolls of the State Bar Council are con-
cerned, they are subjected to various restrictions as the [legal] profession is treated as a noble 
profession in the country and is not treated as a trade or a business.”). 
 51 Id. ¶ 7. 
 52 See id. ¶ 6. 
 53 See Zach Lowe, Blocking a (Kind of) Already Blocked Passage to India, THE AMLAW 
DAILY (Apr. 16, 2010), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/04/passagetoindia.html 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2014), (“Balaji spends about five pages in his 24-page complaint outlining 
the hurdles Indian lawyers face in gaining a license to practice in London, including earning an 
LLM degree and paying thousands of pounds in admissions fees.”); see also Affidavit of Petition-
er, supra note 46, ¶¶ 8–10, 17–20 (“[T]he issue being raised is not just that of opening up the 
Indian legal sector . . . but also reciprocally permitting Indian lawyers and law firms to gain free 
and unhindered access to enter the UK and practice law as a profession.”). Balaji’s reciprocity 
demands also required reciprocal immigration policies. See id. ¶ 20 (“It is equally important that 
immigration clearances are made easy for Indian lawyers in exchange for permitting foreign law 
firms to set up practice in India.”). 
 54 See Affidavit of Petitioner, supra note 46, ¶ 5. 
 55 Id. ¶ 8. 
 56 See id. ¶ 9. Balaji does not cite any judicial precedent for this proposition. See id. 
 57 See id. ¶¶ 9, 22. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. ¶ 18. 
24 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
vantage compared to their foreign competitors.60 According to the petition, 
these restrictions are imposed because “the [legal] profession is treated as a 
noble profession in [India],” 61 unlike foreign countries that treat it as a 
business or money making venture.62 
The defendant law firms disputed the notion that the Advocates Act 
bars foreign lawyers from practicing non-domestic law.63 On the contrary, 
the Advocates Act omits any explicit mention of foreign or international 
law.64 Therefore, defendants argued, the Act only regulated the practice of 
Indian law.65 Defendants found further support in the Lawyers Collective 
judgment, which, they claimed, was limited to a resolution of the question 
that “practice of law,” under Section 29 of the Advocates Act, meant liti-
gious and non-litigious activities. 66  Moreover, as one firm reasoned, 
“[F]oreign law, including English and US law are not taught in Indian Law 
Colleges. Therefore, lawyers with Indian law degrees clearly do not have 
the knowledge to practice foreign law.”67 Accordingly, the firm asserted, it 
is unreasonable to construe the Advocates Act as applying to non-domestic 
law.68 
Ultimately, the Madras Court dismissed Balaji’s petition.69 In doing so, 
the Court announced four rulings.70 The first affirmed that foreign lawyers 
cannot engage in law practice—litigation or otherwise—in India without 
first enrolling as advocates.71 
In its second holding, the Madras Court determined that the Advocates 
Act did not bar foreign firms from visiting India on a temporary basis in 
order to advise clients on matters of foreign and international law. 72 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Madras Court distinguished the Lawyers Col-
lective decision.73 The Madras Court observed that the issue raised in Law-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See id. ¶ 17. 
 61 Id. ¶ 16. 
 62 See id. (“[S]o far as Lawyers and Law Firms from outside the Territory of India are con-
cerned, they are treating it as a business venture, a trade and a money spinner . . . .”). In Lawyers 
Collective, the Bombay High Court made a similar point, that is distinguishing between commer-
cial and professional (e.g. legal) activities, when deciding that RBI lacked the authority to issue 
liaison licenses to foreign firms. See Lawyers Collective, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995, ¶ 55. 
 63 See Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶¶ 7, 8, 11–13, 18, 20, 24. 
 64 See id.; see generally Advocates Act. 
 65 Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶¶ 7, 8, 11–13, 18, 20, 24. 
 66 See id. ¶ 20 (“The said judgment does not hold that the Advocates Act applies to the prac-
tice of foreign law or international law within the territory of India.”). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. ¶ 64. 
 70 See id. ¶ 63. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. ¶¶ 39–45. 
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yers Collective was whether the RBI had the authority to grant foreign law 
firms liaison offices, and, if so, whether a foreign lawyer engaging in trans-
actional work must first enroll as an advocate.74 In contrast, the issue in 
Balaji was whether the Advocates Act bars foreign lawyers from engaging 
in “fly in, fly out” activities to advise on matters of foreign law.75 Because 
the Advocates Act did not specifically address the question, the Madras 
Court held that the Act did not prohibit it.76 
Moreover, in its third holding, the Madras Court declared that foreign 
lawyers may enter India for the purpose of conducting international arbitra-
tions.77 Here, the Madras Court did not mention the Advocates Act.78 In-
stead it relied on the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996.79 Specifical-
ly, the Madras Court found force in the defendants’ argument that debarring 
foreign lawyers from conducting arbitrations in India would have a coun-
terproductive effect on the Indian government’s express goal of making In-
dia a hub for international arbitration.80 The Madras Court observed that 
India’s membership in the World Trade Organization fueled a cottage indus-
try in international commercial arbitration: 
[I]nternational establishments entering into trade agreements would 
require to (sic) consult legal experts on the implications of such 
agreements on their country’s laws, and advocates practising Indian 
law would not be competent to offer them advise on their laws. 
Therefore, this makes it utmost necessary for foreign legal experts 
to visit India, stay here and offer advice to their clients in India on 
their respective laws, and there is no specific provision in the Act 
prohibiting a foreign lawyer to visit India for a temporary period to 
advise his/her clients on foreign law.81 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See id. ¶¶ 39–44. After framing the issue as such, the Madras High Court did indeed affirm 
that aspect of Lawyers Collective: “The Bombay High Court, therefore, rightly held that establish-
ing liaison office in India by the foreign law firm and rendering liaisoning (sic) activities in all 
forms cannot be permitted since such activities are opposed to the provisions of the Advocates Act 
. . . .” Id. ¶ 44. 
 75 See id. ¶ 45. The Madras High Court asserts that this issue was not raised in Lawyers Col-
lective. See id. ¶¶ 39–45. 
 76 See id. ¶ 60. In reaching its conclusion, the Court agreed with defendant law firms’ argu-
ments. See id. The court declared that if “an interpretation is given to prohibit practice of foreign 
law by a foreign law firms [sic] within India, it would result in a manifestly absurd situation 
wherein only Indian citizens with Indian Law degree[s] who are enrolled as an advocate under the 
Advocates Act could practice foreign law . . . .” Id. 
 77 See id. ¶ 63. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. ¶ 51. 
 81 Id. 
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The final holding pertained to legal process outsourcing providers 
(LPO).82 The Madras Court found that the defendant LPO was not perform-
ing legal services, and therefore did not come within the scope of the Advo-
cates Act.83 The Madras Court did state, however, that the BCI has the au-
thority to take appropriate action against an LPO in the event that a provider 
is accused of violating the Act.84 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Madras Court’s decision further exposed the weaknesses of the 
1961 Advocates Act.85 As the Madras Court’s practical approach demon-
strates, the Act is incompatible with the economic policies of the Indian 
government.86 Furthermore, the text of the Act itself facilitates a standoff 
between domestic and foreign lawyers, specifically resulting from its failure 
to define “practice of law” and “reciprocity.”87 Finally, the decision largely 
ignores the inherent difficulties of enforcing the Act’s provisions.88 
The Advocates Act ban of foreign lawyers is at odds with India’s Arbi-
tration and Conciliation Act of 1996, and the government’s express goal to 
make India a hub of international arbitration.89 Under the language of the 
Advocates Act, in order for a foreign lawyer to argue in arbitration without 
running afoul of the Act, such activity cannot in any way constitute the 
“practice of law.”90 The Madras Court did not even try to make such an ar-
gument.91 Instead, the judges took a pragmatic approach by citing the gov-
ernment’s national interest in encouraging international commercial arbitra-
tion, which required the participation of foreign lawyers.92 
In supporting their decision, the judges also relied on the Indian Su-
preme Court’s observations in a 2012 case pertaining to the impact of for-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. 
 83 See id. ¶ 63; see also Ganz, supra note 4 (“[The Madras High Court] does not adequately 
settle the question of the nature of LPOs, defining them simply as BPOs [business process out-
sourcing providers] that do back-office work for foreign lawyers.”). 
 84 See Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶ 63. 
 85 See, e.g., Ganz, supra note 4 (“[T]he judges were explicit in their practical approach by 
citing the government’s stated ‘national interest’ of making India an international arbitration hub, 
which would clearly not be possible without foreign lawyers being allowed to arbitrate here.”); see 
also Balaji v. Gov’t of India, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶ 51 (Madras H.C. Feb. 21, 2012) (India), 
available at http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/qrydisp.aspx?filename=35290 (last visited Oct. 16, 
2014). 
 86 Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶ 51. 
 87 See Jain, supra note 22. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See Ganz, supra note 4; Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶¶ 51–58. 
 90 See Ganz, supra note 4; Advocates Act. 
 91 See Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶¶ 51–57. 
 92 See id. ¶ 58. (“[W]e should not lose site of the fact that in the overall economic growth of 
the country, International Commercial Arbitration would play a vital part.”). 
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eign direct investment (FDI) on the Indian economy, which, the Indian Su-
preme Court held, was a matter of significant public importance. 93 The 
Madras Court further reasoned that the availability of international arbitra-
tion played a “vital part” in the inflow of FDIs into India.94 It is interesting 
that in Lawyers Collective, the Bombay High Court, in revoking the foreign 
firm’s commercial operating licenses as violations of the Advocates Act, 
concluded that there was a fundamental distinction between commercial 
and professional, i.e. legal, enterprises; whereas here the Madras Court re-
lied upon a case dealing with commercial matters to justify the entry of for-
eign lawyers.95 
In addition to the Act’s incompatibility with India’s modern economic 
policies, the text itself perpetuates the faceoff between domestic and foreign 
lawyers.96 The text does not define “practice of law,” and this omission has 
opened the door for defendant firms to argue, before Indian attorneys and 
judges no less, that the “practice of law” does not include foreign and inter-
national law; therefore, the law that regulates all lawyers in India is inappli-
cable to foreign lawyers.97 
For domestic lawyers this is a particularly troubling argument because 
the Act imposes strict regulations on Indian lawyers, hampering their ability 
to compete with foreign firms. 98  In short, these restrictions impede the 
modern Indian’s lawyer ability to effectively compete in a liberalized mar-
ketplace.99 
This argument also puts the Madras Court in a difficult position.100 In 
order to further the country’s economic policies, which include encouraging 
international arbitration, it must construe the Advocates Act as only regulat-
                                                                                                                           
 93 See id. 
 94 See id. ¶¶ 57–58. 
 95 Compare Lawyers Collective v. Bar Council of India, W.P. No. 1526 of 1995 ¶ 55 (Bom-
bay H.C. Dec. 16, 2009) (India) (“[T]here is a distinction between a bureaucrat drafting or giving 
opinion, during the course of his employment and a law firm or an advocate drafting or giving 
opinion to the clients on professional basis.”), with Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶ 58 (“[E]very 
strategic foreign direct investment coming to India, as an investment destination should be seen in 
a holistic manner . . . . Therefore, we should not lose site of the fact that in the overall economic 
growth of the country, International Commercial Arbitration would play a vital part.”). 
 96 See Jain, supra note 22; Advocates Act. 
 97 See Jain, supra note 22; Advocates Act. 
 98 See Lawyers in India: Legally Barred, ECONOMIST (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.economist.
com/node/11090513 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (stating that Indian lawyers in favor of liberation 
argue that the Indian market must be opened gradually in order to give regulators the time to relax 
the tight restrictions on Indian lawyers.). 
 99 See Lawyers in India: Legally Barred, supra note 98; Advocates Act. 
 100 See Ganz, supra note 4. The article notes that the Madras Court’s decision regarding arbi-
tration was “pure pragmatism,” as the judges explicitly relied on the government’s stated national 
interest and ignored the law’s text. See id. 
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ing the practice of Indian law.101 By doing so, however, the Madras Court 
provides foreign lawyers with an opening into the Indian market without 
addressing the handicaps the Act places on domestic lawyers.102 In order for 
Indian law firms to effectively compete with foreign firms, the Act’s anti-
quated regulations must be relaxed.103 
Finally, the Madras Court’s decision did little to address the difficulties 
inherent in the enforcement of Lawyers Collective, which permitted foreign 
firms to find loopholes to participate in the Indian market.104 To that end, 
the Madras Court did not address whether Indian law firms are permitted to 
collaborate with foreign law firms, or whether international law firms can 
advise on matters that include a mixture of both Indian and non-Indian legal 
issues.105 To clear up this matter the courts must better define what it means 
to “practice law” under the Advocates Act.106 
CONCLUSION 
The Madras Court’s decision was a pragmatic attempt to reconcile the 
Advocates Act with the realities of India’s legal profession today. Foreign 
firms want access to the Indian market and, despite the Advocates Act’s 
stringent restrictions, these firms show no signs of giving up on finding a 
way into that market. Indeed, while the Lawyers Collective decision was 
pending, foreign law firms found new ways to enter India’s legal market 
which went unaddressed by the Bombay High Court’s judgment 
The Madras Court’s judgment in A.K. Balaji emphasized the deficien-
cies of the Advocates Act. On its face, the Act disallows foreign firms from 
conducting international arbitrations in India. This, as indicated by the 
Madras Court’s reasoning, conflicts with the Indian government’s express 
economic goal of making India an international commercial arbitration hub. 
The Act carefully distinguishes the legal profession from other commercial 
enterprises, though, as the Madras Court indicates, the legal profession is 
necessary to further the government’s commercial goals. 
Ultimately, the Madras Court’s decision foreshadows that the Indian 
legal market will have to open to foreign lawyers. The Advocates Act, how-
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010 ¶ 58; Ganz, supra note 4. 
 102 See Balaji, W.P. No. 5614 of 2010, ¶ 58; Ganz, supra note 4. 
 103 See Lawyers in India: Legally Barred, supra note 98. 
 104 Vena, supra note 6, at 205 & n.122 (“[T]he allegations of the recently filed Balaji suit . . . 
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no remedy that Indian authorities can enforce.”). 
 105 See id. at 205 & n.127. 
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ever, as the ruling illustrated, does not allow for a level playing field. Indian 
lawyers are prevented from marketing their services and impeded from ex-
panding their firms. This Act needs to be revised to reflect the modern reali-
ties of India’s legal profession and to allow domestic lawyers to fairly com-
pete with their international colleagues. 
